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COMMENTARIES

STATE LOYALTY OATHS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
RESURRECTION
Statutes and constitutional provisions requiring all present and prospective state employees to affirm their loyalty to democratic institutions were
enacted in many states following World War II.' The intent of this legislation
was purportedly to protect governments, schools, and citizens from the infiltration of the Communist Party and those conspiratorial fanatics whose first
allegiance was to the forceful destruction of the democratic forms of government.2 Immediately after enactment, state loyalty oaths were attacked by
those who charged that such legislation was violative of the first and fourteenth amendments.3 These early challenges, however, were rejected by the
United States Supreme Court.4 In 1952 the Court stated in Adler v. Board of
Education5 that employment by the state was not a right.6 So long as the terms
of employment were not unreasonable, the Court continued, there was no
infringement upon first amendment freedoms.7 Moreover, if present or prospective state employees did not wish to comply with these conditions they
could retain their beliefs and associations and seek employment elsewhere. 8
In late 1952 the Court began to abandon its prior support of loyalty legislation. In Wiedman v. Updegraff9 the Court, holding that a state could not
proscribe innocent membership in an organization that the individual did
not know was subversive, 0 declared an Oklahoma oath unconstitutional. This
was the first of a series of decisions expressly rejecting the contention that
the privilege of state or federal employment may be conditioned on a restriction of the freedoms of speech and association.In light of these more recent judicial decisions concerning loyalty legislation it is appropriate, in an effort to determine what standards must be met

1. E.g., CAL. CONsT. art. X, §3 (1952); FLA. STAT. §876.05 (1969).
2. E.g., Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25046, at 102-04 (preamble).
3. E.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 197 Md. 282, 78 A.2d 660, aff'd
per curiam, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
4. E.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 197 Md. 282, 78 A.2d 660, aff1'd per
curiam, 341 US. 56 (1951).

5. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
6. Id. at 492.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
10. Id. at 190-91. The Court also stated: "[C]onstitutional protection does extend to
the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary and discriminatory." Id. at 192.
11. See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Slochower v. Board
of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
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by such legislation, to examine a particular oath that has been tested repeatedly in the courts and found wanting of constitutional safeguards. The
Florida loyalty oath 12 is particularly well suited for this type of analysis's
and provides a basic framework upon which to construct a constitutional
loyalty oath.
FLORIDA LOYALTY LEGISLATION

Following legislative approval Florida's first statutory loyalty oath and
related enforcement provisions 14 were signed into law on May 12, 1949.15 The
expressed intent of the legislature was to protect the state and its agencies from
infiltration and destruction by subversive individuals. 1 6 To accomplish these
ends the Florida oath required all state employees and prospective employees to swear:1
(1) [Constitutional Support Clause] That I will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida.
(2) [Communist Party Membership Clause] That I am not a member of the Communist Party.
(3) [Communist Party Support Clause] That I have not and will
not lend my aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist
Party.
(4) [Belief Clause] That I do not believe in the overthrow of the
Government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force
or violence.
(5) [General Membership Clause] That I am not a member of any
organization or party which believes in or teaches, directly or indirectly,
the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of Florida
by force or violence.
Despite the 1952 Wiedman'8s decision Florida's loyalty oath provisions
were not judicially attacked in the Supreme Court until 1961 in Cramp v.
Board of Public Instruction.- In that case the Communist Party support
clause was held unconstitutional. The majority reasoned that to force an
employee to execute this uncertain and vague portion of the oath under
threat of subsequent prosecution for perjury20 or summary dismissal 2' would
12. FLA. STAT. §876.05 (1969).
13. The Florida oath has been tested in the United States Supreme Court on two
occasions and both decisions provide a thorough analysis of the standards applicable to such
oaths. See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971): Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). For the background on Connell, see Connell v. Higginbotham, 305
F. Supp. 445 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
14. FLA. STAT. §§876.05-.10 (1969).
15. Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25046, §8, at 105 (approval).
16. Id.
17. FiA. STAT. §876.05 (1969).
18. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
19. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
20. See FLA. STAT. §876.10 (1969).
21. See FLA. STAT. §876.06 (1969).
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constitute a denial of due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 22
2
On remand to the Florida supreme court the statute was held to be severable,
leaving the remaining four clauses in force. Following the Cramp decision
the legislature, apparently feeling that the remaining clauses dealt adequately
with subversives, made no attempt to amend the stricken clause.
Following later successful attacks on other states' loyalty legislation,2 4
Florida made no attempt to amend its oath to comply with the developing
constitutional standards in this area. Consequently, in Connell v. Higginbotham25 a federal district court invalidated both the Communist Party membership clause and the general membership clause for unduly infringing upon
the right of freedom of association. 26 On appeal the Supreme Court also invalidated the belief clause,27 noting that failure to execute this portion of the
oath subjected employees to summary dismissal 28 without hearing or inquiry
required by due process. 29 Therefore, presently only the constitutional support clause of Florida's oath remains.30 This surviving provision appears to be
safe from further constitutional attack, since it demands no more of Florida
public employees than is required of all state and federal officers. 31 Whether
this single clause adequately accomplishes the state's legitimate interest in
protecting itself, its institutions, and its citizens from subversion2 is a
question the legislature must now consider. If the existing oath is deemed
inadequate to accomplish its original purposes, 3 3 and these purposes are
still considered to be valid, the legislature must then enact loyalty statutes
that will accomplish these goals without violating constitutional standards.
Some citizens will undoubtedly be opposed to any form of loyalty oath
legislation. Many argue that individuals sincerely bent upon destroying
democratic institutions would not betray their intent by failing to comply

22. 368 U.S. 278, 283-84 (1951).
23. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 137 So. 2d 828, 831 (Fla. 1962).
24. Whitehall v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) (Maryland); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1957) (New York); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (Arizona); Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (Washington).
25. 305 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
26. Id. at 452.
27. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208-09 (1971).
28. See FLA. STAT. §876.06 (1969).
29. Connell v. Higginbotham 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971). But see Cole v. Richardson, 92
S. Ct. (1972), a constitutional support clause and a belief clause in a Massachusetts
loyalty oath, where the Court did not require a hearing prior to dismissal.
30. Id.
31. Id. See U.S. CoNsr. art VI. Similar statutory provisions have consistently been held
constitutional. See, e.g., Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd per
cuiam, 397 U.S. 317 (1970); Hosack v. Smiley, 276 F. Supp. 876 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd
per curiam, 390 U.S. 744 (1968); Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 36 (1968).
32. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967).
33. See Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25046, at 102-04 (preamble). See generally R. BROWN,
LoYALTY

AND SE-UtrY

223-37 (1958); Israel, Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the

Oath?, 1966 SUPREhM Cr. REv. 193, 220-45.
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with all employment prerequisites, including the execution of loyalty oaths.34
Only those who conscientiously believe such oaths to be infringements on
their constitutional rights, the argument continues, object to executing
them.35 Their conclusion is, therefore, that oaths are a totally ineffective
means of protecting the state.3 6 As has been noted by one commentator,
however, the effectiveness of loyalty oaths is purely a matter of conjecture.3 7
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that the state has power to
safeguard the public service from disloyal conduct so long as it does not
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved
Any revision of Florida's oath must, therefore, be narrowly drawn so as to comply with all enunciated constitutional standards.
PROPOSED LOYALTY OATH

The constitutional support clause can be retained in its present form
without fear of being stricken by the courts. 39 The two membership clauses, 40
however, require more extensive analysis before acceptable substitutes can be
drafted. These clauses, as well as other Florida statutes dealing with criminal
communism, 41 were patterned after the Smith Act 42 and, therefore, must be
interpreted in accordance with federal decisions construing this Act. 43 The
membership clauses did not require a showing of a member's "specific intent"
to carry out the known illegal aim of the organization through some overt
activity 44 that creates a "clear and present danger" to the state. 45 Therefore,
in Connell v. Higginbotham4- these clauses were found to be deficient despite
the fact that Florida courts had read the requirement of scienter into the
clauses.41

34. See Israel, supra note 33, at 247.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 248.
38. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
39. See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971), which upheld the constitutional support clause. See also Cole v. Richardson, 92 S. Ct.
(1972); note 31 supra.
40. Provisions (2) and (5) appearing in the text deal with membership in proscribed
organizations [hereinafter cited as membership clauses]. See text preceeding note 18 supra.

41.

FLA. STAT.

§§876.01-.04 (1969).

42. 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1970).
43. See State ex rel. Feldman v. Kelly, 76 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 1954), where the court,
in order to interpret the Florida statutes, noted numerous federal decisions construing the
Smith Act. The United States Supreme Court also implied it would impose upon state
prosecutions for subversive activity the same standards as applied to Smith Act prosecutions. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966).
44. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 221-22 (1961).
45. It is generally assumed that the existence of a conspiracy within an organization to
accomplish illegal aims is the danger. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
46. 305 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
47. State v. Deitz, 97 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1957) (an individual must knowingly be a member

of the organization).
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Hence, any revision of the two membership clauses, to be consistent with
federal standards, must proscribe only active, participating membership by
one who has knowledge of the organization's illegal aims and the specific
intent to carry out these illegal aims. In addition, a single, constitutionally
phrased membership clause would protect the state from infiltration by
members of all subversive organizations. Therefore, membership in the Communist Party need not be specifically proscribed. All constitutional standards
seem to be met in section 876.051 (1) of the legislation proposed in the appendix:
I am not knowingly an active participating member of any organization or party that believes in or teaches, directly or indirectly, the overthrow of the Government of the United States and the State of Florida, or
both, by force or violence and do not have the specific intent to effectuate
such overthrow.
While the proposed membership clause is considered to be a valid control
over individuals who are active members of subversive organizations, individuals operating apart from any formal association could share and actively
pursue the same illegal goals as those with the requisite membership. Since
such individuals pose an equal threat to the security of the state as those with
formal membership, mere lack of membership should not be a bar to preventing their employment when they act with the knowledge and specific
intent to effectuate illegal goals.
Therefore, the conduct and beliefs referred to in the Communist Party
support clause and the belief clause of Florida's oath can be the basis for
denying an individual state employment, provided the legislation is narrowly
drawn. 48 The Communist Party support clause was apparently intended to
deny state employment to those who directly assisted the Communist Party
but who were not actually party members. Since knowledge, action, and
specific intent are required before any such clause is valid, anyone actively
assisting the party with knowledge of the party's illegal aims and with the
specific intent to effectuate these aims would necessarily be an individual
who believed in the overthrow of the Government by force or violence. Therefore, any oath revision, that includes a single clause proscribing belief in
the violent or forceful overthrow of the Government, accompanied by actions
in furtherance of this belief with the specfic intent to give it effect, would
accomplish the ends originally sought by the existing Communist Party
support clause and the belief clause:
I do not consciously and knowingly believe in the overthrow of the
Government of the United States or the State of Florida, or both, by
force or violence and do not actively practice this belief with the specific
intent to effectuate such overthrow.

48. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89
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In Connell v. Higginbotham49 the Supreme Court struck down the belief
clause of Florida's oath, not because it condemned mere belief50 but rather
because it failed to provide for a hearing prior to dismissal of nonsigners. 51
Mr. Justice Marshall pointed out in his concurring opinion, however, that
"state action injurious to an individual cannot be justified on account of the
nature of the individual's belief, whether he 'believes in the overthrow' or has
52
any other sort of belief."
Since this view might be accepted at some future time s3 and because the
proposed legislation is intended to meet all constitutional attacks, the proposed belief clause conforms to the same standards applied to the membership
clause. In addition, a hearing provision is included in section 876.061 of the
proposed legislation, which applies to the oath in its entirety:
If any person required by subsection (1) of section 876.051 above to
take the oath herein provided for fails to execute the same, the governing
authority under which such person would be or is employed shall cause
said person to be disqualified for state employment if said person is not
yet so employed, or immediately suspended without pay if said person
is presently so employed. Any person who is so disqualified or suspended
shall be informed in writing by this governing authority within ten (10)
days of such disqualification or suspension the reasons for his disqualification or suspension. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice, said
person retains the right to request a formal hearing in accordance with
chapter 120, Florida Statutes. If such request is not so made, the disqualification or suspension shall become final. If such request is made and it
is determined that said person is not eligible for state employment by
virtue of his subversive activities or his general uncooperativeness, the
disqualification or suspension shall become final. Any statement made by
said person at the formal hearing concerning his subversive activities shall
not be used as evidence in any subsequent criminal prosecution. Should it
be determined that said person is eligible for state employment, however,
he shall be immediately employed or reinstated and entitled to receive payment for the period of his disqualification or suspension.
This hearing provision requires the nonsigning employee or prospective
employee to state his reasons for refusing to execute the oath. Some may

49. 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
50. "Mere belief" seems so analogous to "mere membership" it is strange the Court
did not adopt the "void on its face" philosophy of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967), and Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
51. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971).
52. Id. at 209 (Marshall, J., concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
53. Justices Douglas and Brennan joined in Marshall's concurring opinion. Justice
Stewart, however, argued for remand to the district court for an interpretation of the
belief clause. Id. at 210 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part). Thus, only five Justices shared
the view that the belief clause is invalid solely because it fails to provide for a hearing
or an inquiry. This split indicates that their view should be accepted with extreme caution.
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question whether this requirement violates the fifth and fourteenth amend54
ments by imposing a choice between self-incrimination and job forfeiture.
In Konigsberg v. State Bar,55 however, an individual had been denied admission to the bar for failing to answer questions concerning his membership
in the Communist Party. The Supreme Court applied a "balancing" approach and upheld the right to question public employees concerning Communist Party membership: 56
ohe interest in not subjecting speech and association to the deterrence
of subsequent disclosure is outweighed by the State's interest in ascertaining the fitness of the employee for the post he holds, and hence...
such questioning does not infringe constitutional protection.
obstructed a
The Court felt that petitioner's refusal to answer questions
5
7
qualifications.
his
of
proper and complete investigation
5
In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education- a college professor was summarily dismissed following his refusal to testify concerning his past activities
with the Communist Party. While the Supreme Court held this petitioner's
59
discharge unconstitutional, it stated:
This is not to say that Slochower has a constitutional right to be an
associate professor of German at Brooklyn College. The State has broad
powers in the selection and discharge of its employees, and it may be
that proper inquiry would show Slochower's continued employment to
be inconsistent with a real interest of the State.
Actively espousing the overthrow of the Government is subject to criminal sanctions in Florida, 60 but coerced statements obtained under threat of
removal or disqualification from state employment may not be used in any
subsequent criminal proceeding.61 Once immunity is granted, however, statements may be compelled. 62 If one continues to refuse to answer after being
given such immunity, the privilege against self-incrimination is not a bar to
dismissal. 63 The proposed hearing provision provides for the proper inquiry
required by Slochower -immunity is granted and there is no intent to pen-

54. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493

(1967); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). But see Headley v. Baron,
228 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1969).
55. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).

56. Id. at 52.
57. Id. at 55.
58. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
59. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
60.

FLA. STAT. §§876.01-.03 (1969).

61. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,
500 (1967).
62. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968).

63. Id. at 278.
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alize political beliefs. Should the individual still choose to remain silent he
may then be dismissed or disqualified for his general uncooperativeness.64
CONCLUSION

The proposed legislation, consolidated in the Appendix, appears to be a
constitutionalloyalty oath. "[It is not an] attempt [to] directly control speech
[or association] but rather to protect, from an evil shown to be grave, an
interest clearly within the governmental concern . . . . [Its concern is with]
a limited class of persons in or aspiring to public positions by virtue of which
they could, if evilly motivated, create serious danger to the public safety. The
principal aim of [these] statutes is not to penalize political beliefs but to
deny positions to persons supposed to be dangerous because the position might
be misused to the detriment of the public."65 There will most certainly be
those who will still attack this proposal as a patent violation of their constitutional rights. However, as newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Lewis
F. Powell wrote recently: 68
The radical left - expert in such matters - knows the charge of repression is false. It is a cover for leftist-inspired violence and repression
...designed to undermine confidence in the free institutions, to brainwash the youth, and ultimately to overthrow our Democratic system....
Law-abiding citizens have nothing to fear ....Those who charge suppression say that dissent is suppressed and free speech denied. Despite
wide credence given this assertion, it is sheer nonsense.
MORGAN STrVENSON BRAGG

64. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Lerner v. Casey, 857 U.S. 468
(1958); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
65. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 54 (1961), (quoted from Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 527 (1958)).
66. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Oct. 22, 1971, §A at 12, cols. 3-4. These comments first appeared in the Richmond, Virginia, Times Dispatch on August 1, 1971, and were subsequently reprinted in the F.B.I. Law Enforcement Bulletin, October 1971.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED L I.ATION
LOYALrY OA'a

To

REPLAcE FLoRIDA

STATUTES

§§876.05-.06,

STATE

EMPLOYEES

876.051. State employees: oath (1) All persons who now or hereafter are employed by or who now or hereafter are on
the payroll of the state, or any of its departments and agencies, subdivisions, counties, cities,
school boards and districts of the free public school system of the state or counties, or institutions of higher learning and all candidates for public office, are hereby required to take

an oath before any person duly authorized to take acknowledgements of instruments for
public record in the state in the following form:
I,
, a citizen of the State of Florida and of the United States of
America, and being employed by or an officer of
and a recipient of

public funds as such employee or officer do hereby solemnly swear or affirm that I will
support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida; that I am
not knowingly an active participating member of any organizaion or party, that believes
in or teaches, directly or indirectly, the overthrow of the Government of the United States
and the State of Florida, or both, by force or violence and I do not have the specific
intent to effectuate such overthrow; and that I do not consciously and knowingly
believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or the State of
Florida, or both, by force and violence and do not actively practice this belief with the
specific intent to effectuate such overthrow.
(2) Said oath shall be filed with the records of the governing official or employing
government agency prior to the approval of any voucher for the payment of salary, expenses or other compensation.
876.061. Disqualification,suspension, hearing, discharge for refusal to executeIf any person required by subsection (1) of §876.051 above to take the oath herein
provided for fails to execute the same, the governing authority under which such person
would be or is employed shall cause said person to be disqualified for state employment
if said person is not yet so employed, or immediately suspended without pay if said person
is presently so employed. Any person who is so disqualified or suspended shall be informed
in writing by this governing authority within ten days of such disqualification or suspension
the reasons for his disqualification or suspension. Within thirty days of receipt of such
notice, said person retains the right to request a formal hearing in accordance with Chapter
120, Florida Statutes. If such request is not so made, the disqualification or suspension shall
become final. If such request is made and it is determined that said person is not eligible
for state employment by virtue of his subversive activities or his general uncooperativeness,
the disqualification or suspension shall become final. Any statement made by said person
at the formal hearing concerning his subversive activity shall not be used as evidence in
any subsequent criminal prosecution. Should it be determined that said person is eligible
for state employment, however, he shall be immediately employed or reinstated and
entitled to receive payment for the period of his disqualification or suspension.
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